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= e Morality of Prophylactic Legislation 
(with Special Reference to Speed Limits, 
Assisted Suicide, Torture, and 
Detention Without Trial)
Michael C. Dorf *
Prophylactic Legislation Deﬁ ned
My subject is the morality of prophylactic legislation. What do I mean 
by ‘prophylactic’ legislation? Let me illustrate the concept by drawing a 
contrast with the most famous hypothetical case in the scholarly litera-
ture of Anglo-American jurisprudence. During the course of their debate 
over the relation between law and morality, Lon Fuller and H. L. A. Hart 
disagreed about what tools are needed to discern the meaning and scope 
of a rule barring vehicles from a public park.¹ Hart and Fuller clashed 
over whether legislative purpose and considerations of morality enter into 
the process of discerning what Hart famously called the ‘core of settled 
meaning’.² = ey themselves did not disagree about the fact that there will 
be cases at the margin of this and every rule, but the example has since 
come to illustrate the various positions one can take on marginal applica-
tions, especially the following question: when, if ever, should ambiguous 
statutory language be construed to reach circumstances that were not 
speciﬁ cally contemplated by the legislature?
My topic concerns the relation between law and morality, but in a 
somewhat diﬀ erent sense from the way in which Hart, Fuller, and others 
have mooted these issues. For one thing, I am interested in the question 
of whether a legislature ought to enact a law, not in how judges should 
* = e author thanks Sherry Colb and Elizabeth Emens for very helpful conversations, 
and Jessica Karp for excellent research assistance.
¹ Compare L. L. Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart’ 
(1958) 71 Harvard Law Review, 663 with H. L. A. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of 
Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review, 607–8.
² Hart, ibid, 607.
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construe laws once they are enacted. For another, I am setting aside the dif-
ﬁ culty of unforeseen circumstances and focusing on problems to which 
the legislature accurately foresees the range of applications of its legisla-
tion, although not the identities of the individuals to whom it will apply. 
‘Prophylactic legislation’, as I shall use the term, refers to laws that the 
legislature deliberately writes so as to cover not only cases presenting the 
mischief it targets, but also some cases in which the legislature knows that 
the law’s background justiﬁ cation fails.
Why would a rational legislature deliberately write a law that applies to 
circumstances in which the law is unjustiﬁ ed? A legislature might ration-
ally decide to over-extend its reach for a number of reasons. It might fear 
that a more narrowly targeted law would be under-inclusive, and that the 
dangers from under-inclusion outweigh those from over-inclusion. Or, 
as I shall elaborate in greater detail shortly, the legislature might choose 
an over-inclusive rule rather than a potentially better targeted standard, 
because the legislature worries that the standard would confer too much 
discretion on those who execute and interpret it.
= us, prophylactic legislation will often be rational but, I shall argue, 
it nonetheless raises profound moral questions whenever it jeopardizes 
fundamental interests for, by deﬁ nition, it does so without suﬃ  cient jus-
tiﬁ cation in the circumstances to which the legislation’s background pur-
pose does not apply. Whether the moral questions can be answered, I shall 
argue further, depends in large part on whether reasonable people behind 
a veil of ignorance could be expected to assent to the prophylactic legisla-
tion. I shall explore these questions using four principal examples: speed 
limits; assisted suicide; torture; and detention without trial.
Speed Limits and the Ubiquity of 
Prophylactic Legislation³
Nearly all laws, and especially those that take the form of rules rather 
than standards, are prophylactic. Speed limits are a well-known example. 
When Parliament speciﬁ es the motorway speed limit of 70 miles per hour, 
it understands that some drivers are capable of driving safely at higher 
speeds. Nonetheless, a law requiring all drivers to drive at ‘no greater than 
the maximum speed at which each individual driver can drive safely, tak-
ing account of all the relevant conditions’, would be nearly impossible 
³ See D. A. Strauss, ‘= e Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules’ (Winter 1998) 55 University 
of Chicago Law Review, 190–209.
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to enforce because of its ambiguity. Furthermore, even apart from ambi-
guity as perceived by the police, regulating motorway speed via a ﬂ ex-
ible standard rather than a rigid rule would sacriﬁ ce the coordination 
advantages that rules can confer. Even allowing for diﬀ erent degrees of 
compliance among the driving population, a 70-mile-per-hour rule will 
do a better job of moving the traﬃ  c along at roughly the same speed than 
will an open-ended ‘drive at a safe speed’ standard.
= us, in the speed limit example, as in much of law, the optimal rule is 
sub-optimal with respect to some individuals; but the rule as a whole may 
still be optimal among the set of all possible rules or standards because no 
rule or standard can be perfect. After all, legislative goals routinely con-
ﬂ ict with one another. A speed limit balances motorists’ interest in safety 
against their interest in arriving at their destinations quickly. Regulating 
speed via a rule rather than a standard has the virtues of precision and 
enforceability but the corresponding vices of over- and under-inclusion 
with respect to very skilled and unskilled drivers respectively; meanwhile, 
a standard has the opposite virtues and vices.⁴
= e prophylactic nature of speed limits—that is, the fact that they 
require some people to drive more slowly than necessary for safety—does 
not by itself make speed limits morally objectionable. To be sure, someone 
could raise a plausible moral objection against a speed limit on the ground 
that it is too high. Reducing the speed limit from 70 miles per hour to 55 
miles per hour would save lives and would mitigate harm to the envir-
onment. Slower speed limits mean fewer and less severe collisions, while 
(within the range of speeds at which people typically drive), fuel eﬃ  ciency 
increases as speed decreases.⁵ Burning fuel more eﬃ  ciently means pump-
ing less carbon dioxide and other pollutants into the atmosphere.⁶ = us, 
one could argue that reducing speed limits is a moral imperative, insofar 
as human lives and the health of the planet should trump the convenience 
that results from faster driving.
I am not now interested in whether the moral arguments for reducing 
the motorway speed limit from 70 to 55 miles per hour (or some other ﬁ g-
ure) are persuasive. I only mean to concede that they are comprehensible 
⁴ = e literature on rules and standards is enormous. For two works by American 
 scholars that nicely capture the core issues, see K. M. Sullivan, ‘= e Supreme Court, 1991 
Term—Foreword: = e Justices of Rules and Standards’ (1992) 106 Harvard Law Review, 
66–9; and F. Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based 
Decision-Making in Law and in Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
⁵ See Committee on the Eﬀ ectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
(CAFE) Standards, et al, Eﬀ ectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) 
Standards (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2002), 77.
⁶ Ibid, 63.
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and plausible as moral arguments. Such arguments, however, do not take 
aim at the prophylactic nature of speed limits. = e claim that the speed 
limit should be reduced is a claim that the law as it now stands is under-
inclusive, not a claim that it is over-inclusive.
By contrast, claims that the speed limit is too low do genuinely target 
the prophylactic nature of speed limits. Yet these arguments probably 
should not qualify as moral arguments, and even if they do, I imagine 
they will strike most people as very unpersuasive moral arguments. To 
argue for increasing the speed limit (or against decreasing it) in moral 
terms, notwithstanding the cost in human lives and to the environ-
ment, requires one to stake out a very strongly libertarian position. In 
the United States, some libertarians object to laws requiring motorists to 
wear seatbelts or motorcyclists to wear helmets on the ground that indi-
viduals should be permitted to choose for themselves how to evaluate 
the costs and beneﬁ ts of beltless or helmetless driving.⁷ Yet even strong 
libertarians recognize that harm to others counts as a reason for limit-
ing freedom.⁸ Speed limits do not merely protect you against yourself; 
they beneﬁ t everyone through their pollution-reducing eﬀ ect and they 
protect innocent third parties—other drivers, passengers, and pedes-
trians—against unsafe driving.⁹
It would take not just a libertarian but a full-ﬂ edged anarchist to insist 
upon a moral right to drive as fast as one believes one can safely operate 
one’s vehicle, when the cost of aﬀ ording people that right will be meas-
ured in serious injuries, lost lives, and harm to the environment. In setting 
the speed limit at 70 rather than 55 or at 55 rather than 45, the legislature 
can choose to give some weight to interests in shorter driving times, but 
in doing so, it is not responding to moral concerns as such.
Alternatively, if you prefer, we might say that the moral concerns raised 
by the driver who wishes to travel very fast are easily outweighed by the 
⁷ See, e.g., T. Balaker, ‘Strapped. Unbuckling Seat Belt Laws’ (27 May 2004) Reason 
Magazine Online, at <http://www.reason.com/news/show/32805.html> (on ﬁ le with 
author).
⁸ See, e.g., J. Sullum, ‘An Epidemic of Meddling, = e Totalitarian Implications of 
Public Health’ (May 2007) 39 Reason Magazine, 23–32 (quoting J. S. Mill’s On Liberty: 
‘= e only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civi-
lized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’).
⁹ I take no position on the question whether a strong libertarian could also support 
seatbelt laws and helmet laws on the ground that persons who suﬀ er more severe injuries 
as a result of beltless and helmetless driving in fact impose a cost on others through the 
diversion of medical care and the loss of their productivity. I am not a strong libertarian, 
and thus I accept paternalistic justiﬁ cations for seatbelt and helmet laws.
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countervailing considerations of safety and environmental protection. 
All constraints on liberty, we might say, raise prima facie moral concerns. 
In this view, just as a conscientious doctor attempts to ‘ﬁ rst do no harm’, 
so a conscientious legislator ought to ‘ﬁ rst infringe no liberty’. Of course, 
good doctors do harm all the time, in the sense that they expose patients 
to serious risks, but they do so only where they calculate that the expected 
beneﬁ ts of the course of treatment outweigh those risks. Likewise, if we 
take seriously the strong libertarian’s moral objection to any speed limits, 
we might say that a good legislator votes for legislation only when its 
bene ﬁ ts outweigh the resulting sacriﬁ ce of liberty. ‘First infringe no lib-
erty’ would thus mean only ‘do not infringe liberty gratuitously’. One can 
readily accept such a dictum—and thus accept that all liberty-infringing 
legislation poses a prima facie moral issue—without thereby accepting 
that all liberty-infringing legislation poses a serious moral issue.
Assisted Suicide
= e picture looks very diﬀ erent, however, where the liberty at stake is 
fundamental in some sense. In American constitutional law, the term 
‘fundamental rights’ has a technical meaning, but I do not mean anything 
technical here.¹⁰ A fundamental liberty, as I use the term, means only a 
liberty that a particular legislator is willing to regard as very important. 
= e liberty to drive at 80 rather than 70 (or 70 rather than 55) miles per 
hour will count as fundamental for almost no-one. = e liberty to which 
I turn now, however, will rank as fundamental for many legislators and 
others.
Consider laws that impose criminal punishment on anyone who vol-
untarily hastens another person’s death—even where the dying person 
is competent, in the late stages of a terminal illness, and experiencing 
physical discomfort that cannot be relieved by palliative care. Some 
¹⁰ = e term refers to those rights, whether speciﬁ cally enumerated in the Bill of Rights 
or inferred from the general protection of the Due Process Clauses, that receive special 
substantive protection. See, e.g., Moore v City of  E. Cleveland 431 US 494, 499, 506, 97 SC 
1932, 1935, 1939 (1977) (recognizing a right to family deﬁ nition). See also M. R. Konvitz, 
Fundamental Rights: History of a Constitutional Doctrine (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers/Rutgers University, 2001), 43–58 (detailing the development of fundamental 
rights jurisprudence). In recent years, the Supreme Court has tended not to use the lan-
guage of fundamental rights: see, e.g., Lawrence v Texas 539 US 558, 123 SC 2472 (2003); 
but since I am not using the term in its technical sense, that is of no concern here.
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 democracies, including Belgium,¹¹ the Netherlands,¹² Switzerland,¹³ and 
one state in the United States—Oregon¹⁴—permit  physician-assisted 
suicide under such circumstances, but many countries, including the 
United Kingdom and the United States outside Oregon, prohibit the 
practice.¹⁵ As with all laws, no doubt the legislators who voted for cur-
rent prohibitions (or voted against repealing them), did so for a variety 
of complicated reasons.
Some such reasons may be non-consequentialist: a legislator or the 
constituents she represents may believe that life is a precious gift from 
God that only God can rightfully withdraw; or the legislator or his con-
stituents may think that suicide is always wrong for secular reasons. I have 
little doubt that this sort of reason ﬁ gures in the decisions of some actual 
lawmakers who favour criminal prohibition of assisted suicide. And to 
the extent that one ﬁ nds this sort of reason persuasive, it overcomes any 
moral objections that an individual who wishes for assistance in dying 
may have: if such assistance is itself wrong, then there can be no funda-
mental right to receive it.
I shall bracket non-consequentialist objections to physician-assisted sui-
cide, both because such objections, if religiously based, raise another set of 
questions about the proper relation between religious motivation and legisla-
tion, and because, as we have just seen, there is no dilemma at all if we admit 
non-consequentialist reasons.¹⁶ I shall focus instead on consequentialist rea-
sons for favouring criminal penalties for assisted suicide.
¹¹ Euthanasia Law (Loi relative à l’euthanasie) 28 May 2002. For a brief description of 
the law, see P. Meller, ‘Euthanasia Ban Ends’ New York Times, 24 September 2002, A13.
¹² Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act (Wet 
toetsing levensbeëindiging op verzoek en hulp bij zelfdoding) 2002. An English translation of 
the Act is available on the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Aﬀ airs website, at <http://www.
minbuza.nl/binaries/minbuza_core_pictures/pdf/c/c_55024.pdf>.
¹³ Swiss Penal Code 1942, Art. 115 criminalizes assisted suicide only where the motive 
is selﬁ sh. For an overview of Swiss assisted suicide law and practice, see S. A. Hurst and 
A. Mauron, ‘Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Switzerland: Allowing a Role for Non-
Physicians’ (1 February 2003) 326 British Medical Journal, 271–3.
¹⁴ Death with Dignity Act 1997.
¹⁵ Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 710, 117 SC 2258, 2263 (1997) (‘[i]n almost 
every State—indeed, in almost every western democracy—it is a crime to assist a suicide’). 
See also R. Cohen-Almagor, ‘Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Democratic 
World: A Legal Overview’ (Winter 2003) 16 New York International Law Review, 1–41. 
For a comparative overview of euthanasia policy that includes Asia, South America, and 
the Middle East, see J. M. Scherer and R. J. Simon, Euthanasia and the Right to Die: A 
Comparative View (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littleﬁ eld, 1999).
¹⁶ I should add in the interest of full disclosure that I do not ﬁ nd the deontological 
objection to all instances of assisted suicide persuasive, even though I do ﬁ nd some deonto-
logical arguments persuasive.
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Consequentialist reasons for regarding legal assisted suicide with dis-
favour may include any or all of the following concerns:
that adequate palliative care will not be made available because (i) 
suicide will come to be seen as an acceptable and substantially less 
expensive alternative;
that family members or doctors will exert pressure on patients to (ii) 
hasten their deaths;
that such pressure will be most acute for women, minorities, and (iii) 
especially the disabled;
that society more generally will place less value on the lives of the (iv) 
severely disabled; and
that the medical profession will lose its focus on the preservation (v) 
of health and life.
It is by no means clear that any or all of these reasons in fact justify ban-
ning assisted suicide, even if we look only at aggregate eﬀ ects. For example, 
there is good reason to think that assisted suicide bans themselves impede 
eﬀ ective palliative care. Even in jurisdictions that accept the principle of 
‘double eﬀ ect’—under which a doctor may prescribe whatever dose of 
narcotic is needed to ease pain, even if that dose kills the patient along 
with her pain—healthcare workers frequently under-medicate pain for 
fear that they will be unable to mount a successful double-eﬀ ect defence 
if prosecuted.¹⁷ Legalization of assisted suicide, under this reasoning, 
enhances rather than undermines the quality of palliative care.
Likewise with respect to the question of professional role, it is by no 
means clear that the appropriate stance for doctors should always be in 
favour of prolonging life. We might well worry that doctors who must 
categorically decline to assist their patients in taking so-called ‘active’ 
measures to end their lives will also be reluctant to ‘let them die’, a right 
that is typically safeguarded, even in jurisdictions in which assisted sui-
cide is prohibited.¹⁸ Accordingly, prohibitions on assisted suicide may 
have a deleterious impact on physician respect for patient autonomy.
¹⁷ See J. K. Rogers, ‘Punishing Assisted Suicide: Where Legislatures Should Fear to Tread’ 
(1994) 20 Ohio Northern University Law Review, 657 (noting practice of under-medicating 
due to fear of litigation despite double-eﬀ ect exception). See also B. A. Rich, ‘= e Politics 
of Pain: Rhetoric or Reform?’ (2005) 8 DePaul Journal of Health Care Law, 519 (‘= e result 
of widespread and highly publicized disciplinary proceedings against physicians for pur-
ported “overprescribing” has been the encouragement of . . . underprescribing’).
¹⁸ I use scare quotes because I doubt that disconnecting a patient from artiﬁ cial hydra-
tion or respiration can be accurately characterized as passively ‘letting die’. = e act of ‘pull-
ing the plug’ is an act, not an omission, as we can readily see by imagining that an assassin 
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I could go on adducing reasons why one might conclude that, when one 
tallies the costs and beneﬁ ts, assisted suicide ought to be legal. However, 
I shall assume for the sake of argument that, on balance and by whatever 
consequentialist calculus one uses to make these judgements, the mix of 
costs and beneﬁ ts associated with prohibition of assisted suicide is prefer-
able to the mix of costs and beneﬁ ts associated with legalization of assisted 
suicide. Even so, prohibition raises moral questions because the conscien-
tious legislator knows that, for some number of patients, the costs of pro-
hibition clearly outweigh the beneﬁ ts, with the result that such patients 
must undergo excruciating suﬀ ering without adequate justiﬁ cation as to 
their circumstances. Such patients raise a moral objection to the prophy-
lactic nature of the assisted suicide ban.
To make the objection concrete, let us imagine a terminal patient 
whom I shall call James Poe.¹⁹ Poe’s suﬀ ering cannot be addressed by 
narcotic drugs. (Perhaps he suﬀ ers from nausea or respiratory distress.) 
= us, he cannot take advantage of the double-eﬀ ect loophole in most 
assisted-suicide prohibitions. Let us imagine further that Poe has suﬃ  -
cient wealth to pay any and all medical costs associated with his further 
treatment but no heirs who are pressuring him to die. Suppose that Poe is 
not a member of any socially disadvantaged group (other than the group 
of people suﬀ ering from excruciating and terminal medical conditions) 
and is adjudged by psychiatric experts to be of sound mind. Finally, let us 
suppose that Poe unequivocally and consistently expresses his desire for 
medication that will kill him painlessly and as soon as possible. Denying 
him assistance (from a doctor or anyone else) in obtaining such medica-
tion sacriﬁ ces his fundamental interest in avoiding suﬀ ering, for the bene-
ﬁ t of others—those who would be at the receiving end of inappropriate 
pressure to end their lives were assisted suicide legal.
Is it a suﬃ  cient answer to Poe to tell him that, although the rule forbid-
ding assisted suicide deprives him of his fundamental interest in avoid-
ing suﬀ ering, that grave harm cannot be avoided without causing greater 
harm to others? Poe will no doubt object that he is not responsible for 
the unfortunate condition of those other people, so that it is unfair to 
require him to bear the costs of the deliberately over-inclusive—that 
pulled the plug of his mortal enemy without the enemy’s consent. = e assassin would be 
guilty of the act of murder. = e diﬀ erence between this case of killing without consent and 
pulling the plug with consent is not the diﬀ erence between an act and an omission but the 
diﬀ erence between an act to which consent is withheld and one to which consent is given.
¹⁹ See Compassion in Dying v Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 795 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), 
reversed by Washington v Glucksberg, note 15 above.
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is,  prophylactic—prohibition on assisted suicide, when the beneﬁ ts go 
exclusively to others.
I can tell you how the American legal system would address this ques-
tion were it presented as an issue of constitutional law. = e US Supreme 
Court rejected this sort of claim in a pair of 1997 decisions, holding that 
the right to physician aid in dying is not a fundamental right in the tech-
nical sense of that term. Consequently, the Court did not demand a truly 
compelling justiﬁ cation from the legislatures of the states of Washington 
and New York.²⁰ But even if the Court had found that Poe had a funda-
mental right, that would not have ended the inquiry.²¹ = e Court would 
have faced the further question whether the states had advanced suﬃ  -
ciently strong justiﬁ cations for the prohibitions.²² In technical language, 
the Court would have asked whether the prohibitions were the ‘least 
restrictive means’ of advancing a ‘compelling interest’.²³
In some sense, that’s just legalese for the proposition that when the 
government infringes on very important liberties, it must have very good 
reasons for doing so. Even if the putative right to assisted suicide does 
not lead courts to examine the reasons given for its prohibition—as it 
would not in either the United States²⁴ or the United Kingdom²⁵—we 
would nonetheless expect legislators in any constitutional democracy to 
ask themselves whether they have very good reasons for enacting laws that 
infringe on very important liberties such as Poe’s claimed right of assisted 
suicide. To borrow the doctrinal test described above, we would want 
legislators to ask whether there is a less restrictive means of accomplish-
ing the obviously important ends of protecting patients against coercion, 
ensuring the availability of palliative care, and so forth.
²⁰ See Washington v Glucksberg, ibid, 728, 2271; Vacco v Quill 521 US 793, 799, 809, 
117 SC 2293, 2297, 2302 (1997).
²¹ For an outline of the steps in fundamental rights analysis, see E. Chemerinsky, 
Constitutional Law (New York: Aspen Law and Business, 2002), 764–8.
²² See, e.g., Roe v Wade 410 US 113, 155, 93 SC 705, 728 (1973) (‘Where certain 
“fundamental rights” are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights 
may be justiﬁ ed only by a “compelling state interest”, and that legislative enactments 
must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake’) (citations 
removed).
²³ See, e.g., Sable Communications of California, Inc. v FCC, 492 US 115, 126, 109 
SC 2829, 2836 (1989) (permitting restriction of fundamental rights ‘in order to pro-
mote a compelling interest if [the government] chooses the least restrictive means to fur-
ther the articulated interest’); see also Chemerinsky, note 21 above, 767 (‘[i]f a right is 
deemed fundamental, the government must present a compelling interest to justify an 
infringement’).
²⁴ See Washington v Glucksberg, note 15 above; Vacco v Quill, note 20 above.
²⁵ See, e.g., R (Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2001] UKHL 61, [2001] 3 
WLR. 1598 (denying terminally ill woman’s request to allow her husband to assist her 
suicide).
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In other words, we would want the conscientious legislator to ask 
whether the burden on Poe is truly necessary to gain the beneﬁ ts that 
accrue to others from a prohibition on assisted suicide. = e answer 
appears to turn on a further, empirical question: would it be possible to 
gain the advantages of a ban on assisted suicide through means short of 
outright prohibition, for example via stringent regulation and expanded 
government funding for palliative care? Even though we have been 
assuming that the aggregate beneﬁ ts of the assisted suicide ban outweigh 
its aggregate costs, the answer to this question might still be yes. = at is 
to say, it is possible that the beneﬁ ts of an outright ban on assisted suicide 
outweigh its costs, but that regulations falling short of an outright ban 
would provide the same beneﬁ ts with fewer costs. In that case, it would 
appear to be impossible to justify the prophylactic ban on assisted suicide 
as applied to Poe (absent the sort of absolute deontological objections to 
assisted suicide that I have bracketed). For, in his case, the ban operates 
as pure cost.
Suppose, however, that the complete ban on assisted suicide truly is 
optimal with respect to aggregate costs and beneﬁ ts, so that the legis-
lature cannot make exceptions for people like Poe without opening the 
door to the sorts of pressures on others that it ﬁ nds unacceptable. By 
whatever measure a legislator uses to determine such things—aggregate 
pleasures minus pains, say, or ‘utiles’—the harms from permitting any 
exceptions outweigh the beneﬁ ts. Even so, presumably Poe would still 
object in exactly the terms I stated above: why should he have to endure 
excruciating pain to prevent third parties over whom he has no inﬂ u-
ence from harming other third parties with whom he has no relationship? 
Anglo-American law traditionally imposes no duty to rescue strangers,²⁶ 
and even in those jurisdictions that depart from the traditional rule, there 
is no duty to rescue strangers where doing so would entail excruciating 
pain.²⁷ Both the traditional rule and the limited nature of the departures 
²⁶ See Keeton et al, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (St. Paul, Minnn: West, 1984), 
374 (‘the law has persistently refused to impose on a stranger the moral obligation . . . to go 
to the aid of another’).
²⁷ See, e.g., Vermont Stat. Ann. tit. 12 s 519(a) (1973) (‘[a] person who knows that 
another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered 
without danger or peril to himself . . . give reasonable assistance’) (emphasis added); Rhode 
Island Gen. Laws ss. 11–56–1 (1956) (‘[a]ny person at the scene of an emergency who 
knows that another person is exposed to, or has suﬀ ered, grave physical harm shall, to the 
extent that he or she can do so without danger or peril to himself or herself or to others, give rea-
sonable assistance’) (emphasis added).
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in those jurisdictions that depart, indicate that such sacriﬁ ces are, in the 
language of moral philosophy, supererogatory.
Torture
Answering Poe’s objection would seem to be an urgent matter, because 
the inability to justify prophylactic legislation would undermine much 
of what the state does—and much of what I think most sensible people 
would want it to do.
So, can the state give a persuasive answer to Poe? = at may depend 
on how we understand the nature of the prohibition on assisted sui-
cide. We might put Poe’s objection in its strongest form with an analogy 
to torture. Suppose that John Doe is a perfectly healthy, completely 
innocent person who has the misfortune to be the son of a kidnap-
per threatening to kill another group of completely innocent people 
that she is holding captive. Could the state torture Doe in order to 
induce his mother to free her captives? = e standard answer in moral 
philosophy—and one that certainly comports with my own moral 
intuition—is no.
Poe can claim that his situation is indistinguishable from Doe’s. By 
threatening doctors with criminal liability if they assist him in hasten-
ing his death, the state prolongs Poe’s agony—in eﬀ ect tortures him—in 
order to prolong the lives of other people, those who do not desire aid 
in dying but would be pressured to end their lives prematurely under a 
regime of legal assisted suicide. = e state can no more torture the inno-
cent Poe through its criminal laws, he says, than it can torture the inno-
cent Doe by hiring a Torquemada.
Not everyone will ﬁ nd this analogy persuasive, and it is tempting sim-
ply to dismiss it by relying on something like the act/omission distinc-
tion. When the state hires Torquemada actually to torture Doe, the state 
is taking action. By contrast, even if a law forbidding assisted suicide is 
not exactly an omission, the state may appear to us to be less responsible 
for Poe’s suﬀ ering than for Doe’s. After all, the state does not inﬂ ict Poe’s 
suﬀ ering; his underlying medical condition does. = e state does forbid 
Poe from obtaining assistance in taking the one measure, suicide, that 
would relieve his suﬀ ering but, unlike in Doe’s case, Poe’s suﬀ ering is 
merely the unfortunate by-product of the state’s cost-justiﬁ ed policy. By 
contrast, the state acting through Torquemada aﬃ  rmatively sets out to 
cause Doe’s excruciating pain. One could plausibly think that there is a 
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moral distinction between deliberately causing suﬀ ering to achieve other-
wise laudable state objectives—rescuing Doe’s mother’s hostages—and 
incidentally preventing the cessation of suﬀ ering to achieve otherwise 
laudable state objectives—avoiding coerced deaths, making palliative 
care available, and so forth.²⁸
But even if it is morally worse for the state to aim at causing great suf-
fering to innocents in order to rescue more innocents than it is for the 
state to cause suﬀ ering to innocents as the incidental cost of other action, 
does it follow that it is morally permissible for the state to take deliber-
ate actions that cause innocents to suﬀ er incidentally? Perhaps a better 
analogy than torture is what we euphemistically call ‘collateral damage’ 
in wartime. = e law of war forbids belligerent nations from targeting 
civilians²⁹ and requires that strikes against combatants minimize civil-
ian casualties,³⁰ but minimization is not prohibition. In war, high-value 
enemy forces can be targeted even though some civilians will be injured 
or killed as a collateral consequence.³¹
Does the same principle apply in civilian life? It would seem to. In 
the United States, for example, police carry and use ﬁ rearms against sus-
pected criminals, with the predictable consequence that sometimes they 
inadvertently injure or kill innocent bystanders.³² Similarly, throughout 
the world vaccines against various deadly diseases predictably cause a 
small number of the people vaccinated to contract the disease itself (or 
suﬀ er other ill eﬀ ects); yet that fact should not prevent the state from 
mandating vaccination so as to greatly reduce the number of people who 
would otherwise contract the disease by other means.³³ = e person who 
contracts the disease from the vaccine would appear to be at least as well 
²⁸ See S. F. Colb, ‘Why is Torture “Diﬀ erent” and How “Diﬀ erent” is it?’ (forthcoming 
in Volume 30 of Cardozo L. Rev. (2009)). In most of Colb’s examples, the state tortures 
people who are not innocent.
²⁹ See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conﬂ icts (Protocol 1) 1979, Arts. 48, 51 (‘= e civilian 
population . . . shall not be the object of attack.’).
³⁰ Ibid, Art. 57(2) (‘[T]hose who plan . . . an attack shall . . . take all feasible precau-
tions . . . to avoid[], and in any event to minimiz[e], incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians and damage to civilian objects’).
³¹ Ibid: (combatants ‘shall refrain from . . . any attack which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life . . . which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated’).
³² For a history of accidental killings of one oﬃ  cer by another in New York, see 
A. O’Connor and S. Paciﬁ ci, ‘A Fatal Wound From a Colleague’s Weapon Is Rare, but 
Always a Risk’ New York Times, 28 April, 2007, B5.
³³ See K. M. Malone and A. R. Hinman, ‘Vaccination Mandates: = e Public Health 
Imperative and Individual Rights’ in R. A. Goodman et al (eds.), Law in Public Health 
Practices (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 264.
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positioned as James Poe to complain about the harm inﬂ icted on him by 
the state: for the beneﬁ t of others, she, an innocent, has been required to 
suﬀ er and perhaps to die.
* e Veil of Ignorance
To be sure, as a matter of public health, it may not make a great deal of 
sense for the state to mandate full vaccination. So-called ‘herd immunity’ 
will work well enough to prevent the spread of most diseases, even with 
vaccination rates falling somewhat short of 100 per cent.³⁴ Moreover, 
imprisoning the parents of minor children or others who resist vaccina-
tion might prove counter-productive, inspiring distrust of public health 
authorities. = ese are legitimate practical objections that I shall simply set 
aside; I will assume that, for some particular disease, mandatory vaccina-
tion is essential for public health. In these circumstances, what justiﬁ ca-
tion can the state give to the vaccine’s victim?
= e state can say that, ex ante, the person who turned out to be a vic-
tim of the vaccine was much more likely to be its beneﬁ ciary. A rational 
calculator, not knowing whether her child will be the 1 in 10,000 who 
contracts the disease or one of the 9,999 children who beneﬁ t from the 
vaccine’s protection against it, would play the odds and have the vaccine 
administered. In this instance, John Rawls’s metaphor of a veil of ignor-
ance works especially well.³⁵ Prior to the vaccine’s administration, no-one 
knows whether her child will be one of the many beneﬁ ciaries or one of 
the small number of victims.
Perhaps more importantly, legislators do not know ex ante which par-
ticular individuals or groups of individuals will end up among the vac-
cine’s victims. Conscientious legislators who aim to adjust beneﬁ ts and 
burdens fairly among their constituents will have no systematic reason to 
under-count or over-count the welfare of any individual or group. If it 
is rational for any parent to prefer the risks from the vaccine to the risks 
from the disease if the vaccination is not given, it is rational for every par-
ent to prefer the former risks. = us, on the assumption that mandatory 
vaccination truly serves public health better than voluntary vaccination, 
in mandating vaccination, the legislature does not in fact prefer the well-
being of the 9,999 to that of the one: it calculates that all 10,000 would 
rationally prefer the smaller risk to the larger one.
³⁴ Ibid.
³⁵ See generally J. Rawls, A 2 eory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1999), 118–23.
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Critics of Rawls have sometimes objected that the veil of ignorance is 
unrealistic.³⁶ How, they ask, could people living in the diverse circum-
stances in which persons in multicultural democracies ﬁ nd themselves, 
truly assess what the basic structure of their political institutions should 
look like without at least some account—even if unconscious—of their 
own particularity?³⁷ = at is a sound objection to the Rawlsian veil of 
ignorance but not much of an objection to mandatory vaccination, for 
however diﬀ erently individuals are situated with respect to other ques-
tions, they are nearly all in roughly the same position with respect to vac-
cines: nearly every rational actor would take the small risk of contracting 
the disease from the vaccine rather than the substantially larger risk of 
contracting the disease if unvaccinated.
I say ‘nearly all’ and ‘nearly every’ rather than ‘all’ and ‘every’ because 
a small number of people object to vaccination on religious grounds, 
and for them the calculus is quite diﬀ erent.³⁸ For someone who believes 
that vaccination will result in eternal damnation, even a substantial risk 
of contracting a deadly disease if unvaccinated—10, 50, or even 90 per 
cent, say—may be a risk worth running. In asking such religious persons 
to don the veil of ignorance, we do potentially run foul of the broader 
objection to the Rawlsian veil.
= e treatment of religious objections to laws of general applicability 
is an important question for any constitutional democracy, but we can 
bracket it here. Within American constitutional law, religious objectors 
are never entitled to faith-based exemptions from truly neutral laws,³⁹ 
although many of our states do provide for some religious exemp-
tions⁴⁰ and a federal statute requires the federal government to justify 
³⁶ For a summary of and response to such criticism, see S. Mulhall and A. Swift, ‘Rawls 
and Communitarianism’ in S. Freeman (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Rawls (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 460–87.
³⁷ Ibid.
³⁸ For two families’ descriptions of their religious objections to vaccination, see Sherr 
v Northport—E. Northport Union Free School District, 672 F. Supp. 81, 92–4 (EDNY 
1987).
³⁹ Employment Div. v Smith, 494 US 872, 882, 110 SC 1595, 1602 (1990) (‘To make 
an individual’s obligation to obey . . . a law [of general applicability] contingent upon the 
law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs . . . contradicts both constitutional tradition and 
common sense’).
⁴⁰ See, e.g., Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 1998 and Illinois 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 1998. Both of these state RFRAs invalidate 
state laws that substantially burden religious exercise unless they are the least restrictive 
means of furthering compelling government interests. For a list of all state religious free-
dom restoration acts as of 2007, see M. G. Kramer, ‘Humane Education, Dissection, and 
the Law’ (2007) 13 Animal Law, 291 (citing state laws in Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, 
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, and Texas).
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the  application of general laws to religious objectors.⁴¹ Even in jurisdic-
tions that do provide some religious exemptions, however, the govern-
ment is not completely disabled from applying its general laws where 
they happen to infringe on religious practices.⁴² Rather, the government 
must simply meet a stricter standard of justiﬁ cation.⁴³ In our example, 
the health of minor children—assuming the vaccination provides signiﬁ -
cant protection against a deadly disease—would likely count as suﬃ  cient 
grounds for overcoming the religious scruples of parents,⁴⁴ although in 
actual practice all but two American states have chosen to exempt parents 
with such scruples from vaccination requirements.⁴⁵
For my present purposes, it is not important to resolve the question 
whether the vaccination example is a case in which rational citizens have 
more or less homogeneous ex ante interests and wishes. My point is only 
that if we identify some such example of roughly homogeneous interests 
and wishes—whether it involves vaccination or something else—the par-
ticularity-based objection to the Rawlsian veil of ignorance lacks bite.
But what about cases in which we agree that people are not ex ante simi-
larly situated? = ese cases fall into two broad categories: those in which 
persons objecting to having to bear the cost of prophylactic legislation are 
politically dominant and those in which the objectors are politically sub-
ordinate. I shall illustrate these cases with examples based, respectively, on 
torture and the detention of alleged terrorists.
A Moral Right to Demand Torture?
Suppose you are a conscientious legislator who does not believe on 
 deontological grounds that torture is always wrong. Nonetheless, you 
⁴¹ Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 1993. RFRA was found unconstitu-
tional as applied to the states in City of Boerne v Flores 521 US 507, 511, 117 SC 2157, 2160 
(1997), but still restrains the federal government: Gonzales v O Centro Espirita Beneﬁ cente 
Uniao do Vegetal 546 US 418, 438, 126 SC 1211, 1225 (2006).
⁴² See e.g. Florida RFRA; Illinois RFRA, note 40 above.   ⁴³ Ibid.
⁴⁴ Interests the Supreme Court has found ‘compelling’ include national security—Haig 
v Agee 453 US 280, 307, 101 SC 2166, 2782 (1981)—and highway safety—Mackey v 
Montrym 443 US 1, 17–9, 99 SC 2612, 2620–1 (1979). To date, most cases upholding laws 
under state RFRA challenges have not reached the compelling interest test, instead ﬁ nding 
no substantial burden. See B. Porto, Annotation, ‘Validity, Construction, and Operation 
of State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts’ (2004) 116 American Law Reports, 233.
⁴⁵ = e most recent comprehensive data I have found are from 2004, and indicate that 
only Mississippi and West Virginia deny religious exemptions from vaccination require-
ments. See ‘States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from Immunization 
School Requirements’ (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2004), available at 
<http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/2004exchart.htm>.
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favour an absolute ban on torture (such as the one contained in the 
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment) on prophylactic grounds.⁴⁶ In 
principle, you believe that there are cases in which torture would be mor-
ally permissible or even required—for example, the well-known ‘ticking 
bomb’ scenario: the authorities believe to a high degree of certainty that 
they have in custody a person who knows but refuses to divulge the loca-
tion of a ticking bomb that will cause catastrophic harm to the civilian 
population. Nonetheless, you favour the absolute ban on torture because 
you believe that, if the law makes any exceptions for ticking bombs, the 
authorities will start to hear bombs ticking everywhere, and an extremely 
limited exception will become the de facto rule.
= ese are reasonable grounds for favouring a blanket ban on torture 
but suppose that a potential victim of the ticking bomb, whom I’ll call 
Joe Blow, comes along and raises the following moral objection: in the 
particular case in which your torture ban prevents the authorities from 
ﬁ nding and defusing the bomb that will kill or maim me, you are impos-
ing on me, an innocent, a duty to rescue—or what amounts to the same 
thing, a duty to sacriﬁ ce life or limb for—likely terrorists. Blow claims a 
moral right to have the state engage in torture for his beneﬁ t.
How might you respond to Blow’s objection? To begin, you can point 
out that you are not demanding his sacriﬁ ce for the beneﬁ t of the terror-
ist. If you favoured the torture ban on deontological grounds—if you 
thought torture were inconsistent with human dignity, say—then you 
would need to explain to Blow why your squeamishness about inﬂ ict-
ing awful suﬀ ering on a suspected terrorist outweighs the suﬀ ering and 
death of Blow and many of his fellow innocent citizens. (You would likely 
rely on the act/omission distinction or something similar.) However, by 
hypothesis, that is not the basis for your support of an absolute torture 
ban. Instead, you worry that allowing any exceptions will lead to the 
torture of innocent people or people from whom information could be 
obtained by other means. If the risks are as you calculate, then this shift 
to the ex ante perspective is, once again, an eﬀ ective response to the moral 
objection to prophylactic legislation.
⁴⁶ = e United Kingdom and the United States are both signatories, although the United 
States has made a number of important reservations. See US Reservations, Declarations, and 
Understandings, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 136 Cong. Rec. S17486–01 (27 October 1990). For a list of 
ratiﬁ cations online, see <http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/
partI/chapterIV/treaty14.asp> and <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/cat/treaties/
convention-reserv.htm> (including text of reservation).
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However, even if the aggregate risks are indeed as you calculate, they 
will not be distributed evenly. If Blow is a member of an ethnic, national, 
or racial group whose members are responsible—or simply believed by 
the authorities to be responsible—for a disproportionate share of terrorist 
acts, Blow may indeed beneﬁ t from the torture ban. But if he were in that 
group, then ex ante at least, he would be quite unlikely to demand that the 
legislature rescind the torture ban. Someone demanding that the state be 
prepared to engage in torture in the ticking bomb scenario is much more 
likely to be a member of a group that envisages the state torturing people 
other than—and diﬀ erent from—himself.
= us, in this case, the veil of ignorance appears to succumb to the 
standard objection that people are situated diﬀ erently. A large number 
of people believe that they will never be tortured, and thus some of them 
want the state to use torture, at least in extreme cases. (Based on the popu-
larity of the American television show ‘24’, in which hero Jack Bauer 
routinely tortures bad guys, ‘some’ may actually be ‘a great many’.)⁴⁷ A 
smaller number of people believe that, if the state uses torture, it will be 
against people with their own characteristics. Ex ante, the calculation of 
whether torture is justiﬁ ed will be diﬀ erent for the two groups. Majority 
group members may rationally conclude that it is worth increasing the 
risk of torturing innocents in order to preserve the safety of the larger 
innocent population because members of the majority group will not be 
among the additional innocents risking torture. Minority group mem-
bers are more likely to make the opposite calculation.
= e conscientious legislator who believes that, all things considered, 
the absolute torture ban is justiﬁ ed, need not give ground to the purport-
edly moral objection of Joe Blow and others like him. What they demand 
is that the state shift the balance of risks and beneﬁ ts from torture away 
from the majority and onto an ethnic, national, or religious minority. 
= is is not a demand in the name of morality addressed to the conscience 
of the legislator but a demand in the name of self-interest addressed to the 
legislator’s own interest in re-election. Legislators have suﬃ  ciently ample 
incentives to sacriﬁ ce minority interests for majority ones that we need 
not worry much when it is claimed that a law sacriﬁ ces majority interests 
for minority ones.
Indeed, the legislature’s incentive to favour—or at least not to disad-
vantage—the majority is so great that one is tempted to look for other 
⁴⁷ For a discussion of torture on ‘24’ and the show’s growing popularity, see A. Stanley, 
‘Suicide Bombers Strike, and America Is in Turmoil. It’s Just Another Day in the Life of 
Jack Bauer’ New York Times, 12 January 2007, E1.
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explanations for laws, like the absolute torture ban, that seem to beneﬁ t 
the minority at the majority’s expense. Again putting aside the deontolog-
ical objections to torture—which will also tend to beneﬁ t the minority—
we can see at least one reason why the legislature might conclude that, 
even from the perspective of the majority alone, an absolute torture ban 
is cost-justiﬁ ed: the legislature might conclude that oﬃ  cially permitting 
any torture will actually increase the net risk of terrorism, because it will 
inspire additional hatred for the state. In one of his few commendable 
displays of good sense, former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
asked in a 2003 ‘snowﬂ ake’ whether US and allied forces were ‘capturing, 
killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the 
madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying 
against’ the United States, thereby acknowledging that overly aggressive 
actions can be counterproductive.⁴⁸
Another explanation for the torture ban could be that the legislature 
does not in fact believe it will work. = at may sound like a cynical view, 
and some versions of this approach are cynical. For example, President 
Bush made a great show of signing into law the Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005, including a blanket prohibition on torture, only to issue an accom-
panying ‘signing statement’ that appears to reserve the power to engage 
in torture anyway.⁴⁹
= ere is also, however, a less cynical basis on which a legislator could 
support a torture ban despite knowing that it will not be fully eﬀ ective. 
Suppose a legislator thinks that the state should sometimes torture, but 
only in the very extreme version of the ticking bomb scenario. Any formal 
exception in the law would have the unintended eﬀ ect of authorizing 
more torture, but in suﬃ  ciently extreme circumstances, the authorities 
can be expected to break the law and engage in torture. = us, the very 
fact that police will be tempted to ignore an absolute torture ban when 
the stakes are suﬃ  ciently high could make the absolute ban the optimal 
rule. In other words, if the conscientious legislator believes that the right 
answer to the question ‘how often should the state torture?’ is not ‘never’ 
⁴⁸ See W. Shapiro, ‘Rumsfeld memo oﬀ ers honest display of doubts about war’ USA 
Today, 24 October 2003, 5A. = e full memorandum can be found at <http://media. 
hoover.org/documents/0817945423_xxv.pdf>.
⁴⁹ See Statement by President George W. Bush upon signing Public Law 109–149, 
2005 United States Code, Congressional and Administrative News, S54, in which Bush 
reserves the right to construe the Detainee Treatment Act ‘in a manner [that is] consistent 
with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch 
and as Commander in Chief . . . [and] which will assist in . . . protecting the American peo-
ple from further terrorist attacks’. See also C. Savage, ‘Bush Could Bypass New Torture 
Ban’ Boston Globe, 4 January 2006, A1, noting legal specialists’ opinions that the  ‘president’s 
signing statement . . . raises serious questions about whether he intends to follow the law’.
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but ‘very very rarely’, then an absolute ban might come closer to achiev-
ing that outcome than any other rule. A legislative ‘never’ would mean 
‘hardly ever’ in practice.
I cannot say with any conﬁ dence whether these or other reasons explain 
why we see complete bans on torture. I can say that, whether the tor-
ture ban is optimal or not in the aggregate, Joe Blow’s purportedly moral 
objection to the state’s refusal to engage in torture rings hollow, even if 
we set aside deontological justiﬁ cations for a complete torture ban. = e 
objection rings hollow because the legislative process is well designed to 
take account of the interests of people like Blow.
We can say nearly the same thing about assisted suicide. Although I 
do not believe that, all things considered, assisted suicide bans are cost-
justiﬁ ed, if one did think that they were cost-justiﬁ ed in the aggregate, 
the ex ante distribution of beneﬁ ts and risks would suﬃ  ciently answer 
our hypothetical James Poe, who objects to the imposition on him of the 
costs needed to avoid harms that a regime of legal assisted suicide would 
supposedly inﬂ ict on others. By hypothesis, assisted suicide bans protect 
society’s most vulnerable members, and so if Poe opposes the ban, he 
is unlikely to be such a person. Instead, like Joe Blow (who complains 
about the torture ban), Poe should be able to get a fair hearing in the 
legislature.⁵⁰
More broadly, we can say that the heterogeneity of the distribution of 
risks does not render prophylactic legislation immoral where the domi-
nant group bears the added risk of a law’s overbreadth. = is conclusion 
has obvious implications for other sorts of laws that protect minorities at 
the seeming expense of the majority, but I shall not address them here.⁵¹
Detention Without Full Trial
Members of minority groups who bear the brunt of prophylactic 
 legislation present a much stronger moral objection, however. Let us 
⁵⁰ Recall that I am assuming that religious opposition to assisted suicide is not the 
reason for the prohibition. If that assumption does not hold, then Poe may well count as 
a religious minority whose welfare the legislature should not be able to sacriﬁ ce for the 
welfare of others.
⁵¹ American constitutionalists will see in my analysis a healthy dose of so-called ‘rep-
resentation-reinforcing’ theory of the sort propounded most famously by the late John 
Hart Ely. See generally J. H. Ely, Democracy & Distrust (London: Harvard University Press, 
1980). Ely argued for careful judicial scrutiny of laws that disadvantage politically disem-
powered groups such as racial minorities and other victims of prejudice, but maintained 
that the outputs of a reasonably well-functioning political process should not be second-
guessed by courts when they disadvantage majority interests for minority ones. See Ely, 
Democracy at 135–79.
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 consider their objection in the context of detention without a full civil-
ian trial.
A familiar maxim states that it is better for ten guilty men to go free than 
for one innocent to be unjustly convicted. Common-law legal systems 
institutionalize this maxim through a number of procedural mechan-
isms, including: trial by jury in serious criminal cases; the requirement of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt; and the exclusion of evidence obtained 
through means that cast doubt on its reliability.⁵² However, since 11 
September 2001 in the US and 7 July 2005 in the UK, some commenta-
tors have argued that the ten-to-one ratio is inappropriate for persons 
suspected of terrorism.⁵³
Two rationales might be thought to justify relaxing the procedural rules 
that implement the ten-to-one principle. First, terrorists who commit 
their crimes by suicide cannot be deterred by the threat of after-the-fact 
criminal punishment. = us, authorities must intervene before they have 
completed their plans, but separating those with innocent intentions 
from those with guilty intentions will often prove more diﬃ  cult than 
determining guilt for a completed act. Indeed, some of the persons the 
state may wish to detain will not have even committed an inchoate crime, 
but are nonetheless highly dangerous. = e perceived need for early appre-
hension may create a concomitant perceived need for a lower threshold of 
certainty before the state apprehends and detains people.
Second, terrorists aim to produce destruction on a greater scale than 
other criminals. = e cost of freeing ten ordinary murderers in order to 
avoid wrongly incarcerating one innocent person accused of murder is, 
according to the ten-to-one maxim, a high cost but one worth bearing. It 
does not follow that the cost is worth bearing when we have ten extraordi-
nary murderers. In other words, to the extent that the ten-to-one maxim 
encapsulates a civil-libertarian-weighted cost-beneﬁ t analysis, the analy-
sis may be diﬀ erent for terrorism.
In my country, these factors may partly explain why the Bush 
 administration has generally sought to avoid trying terrorism suspects 
in civilian courts according to the usual rules of the criminal justice 
⁵² For an overview of US criminal law procedure and the ways in which it ‘reﬂ ects 
a desire to minimize the chance of convicting an innocent person even at the price of 
increasing the chance that a guilty person may escape’, see LaFave et al, Criminal Procedure 
(St. Paul, Minn: West 2004), 30.
⁵³ See e.g. J. Tyrangiel, ‘= e Jihadi Next Door?’ 168 Time, 3 July 2006, 26 (arguing 
that ‘when a handful of terrorists can trigger an exponentially larger tragedy . . . “[y]ou ﬁ nd 
a reversal of the general posit that it is suﬃ  cient that 100 guilty men go free so that one 
innocent man is not convicted” ’) (quoting Ronald Susskind).
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 system.⁵⁴ Instead, the administration has relied on military tribunals for 
both determinations of combatant status and some criminal prosecu-
tions.⁵⁵ Initially, military jurisdiction was asserted over US citizens as 
well as aliens, and our Supreme Court approved of that approach (even 
as it rejected the administration’s claim of unreviewable authority).⁵⁶ 
However, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 made clear that hence-
forth only aliens would be subject to adjudication by military tribunals 
under looser rules than apply in civilian courts.⁵⁷
If we take the ten-to-one ratio as the background operating assump-
tion of common-law legal systems, then the use of any set of procedures 
that substitutes a higher ratio of false positives to false negatives can be 
understood as prophylactic legislation. Suppose, for example, a legis-
lator believes that, given the need for early intervention and given the 
size of the harm perpetrated by terrorists, the proper maxim is ‘better to 
imprison three innocent people at Guantánamo Bay than to mistakenly 
free one determined terrorist’. Based on this one-to-three rather than ten-
to-one ratio (of false negatives to false positives), the government would 
use procedures that reduce the number of dangerous people released but 
at the cost of increasing the number of innocent and harmless people 
imprisoned or killed.
Now suppose that, when we apply the same discount factor as we apply 
in civilian life to produce the ten-to-one rule, we obtain the one-to-three 
rule for terrorism cases. In that case, the conscientious legislator could give 
our by-now-familiar answer to someone who objects to the increased risk 
of erroneous incarceration or execution for terrorism suspects: ex ante, the 
risk is justiﬁ ed because it applies the proper discount factor for balanc-
ing your risk of being improperly incarcerated by the state against your 
risk of being harmed or killed by a terrorist improperly released or never 
apprehended by the state.
⁵⁴ For a discussion of post-11 September use of military tribunals and immigration 
authorities to ‘bypass the criminal process’ in detaining terror suspects, see D. Cole, ‘= e 
New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism’ (2003) 38 Harvard Civil 
Rights–Civil Liberties Law Review, 22–7; R. B. Schmitt, ‘Sidestepping Courts in the War 
on Terrorism’ Los Angeles Times, 30 November 2005, A18. For a review of detentions and 
trials of suspected terrorists from 2001–2007, see J. T. Parry, ‘Terrorism and the New 
Criminal Process’ (2007) 15 William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal, 770–82.
⁵⁵ See Parry, ibid, 770–82. For a description of the military tribunal review process for 
enemy combatant status determination, see T. Golden, ‘For Guantánamo Review Boards, 
Limits Abound’ New York Times, 31 December 2006, 1.
⁵⁶ Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507, 519, 124 SC 2633, 2640 (2004) (‘= ere is no bar to 
this Nation’s holding one of its own citizens as an enemy combatant’).
⁵⁷ See Military Commissions Act (MCA) 2006 s. 948(c), deﬁ ning ‘[p]ersons subject to 
military commissions’ as ‘[a]ny alien unlawful enemy combatant’.
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However, we also have our familiar rejoinder: the risk of being mistak-
enly imprisoned as a terrorist and the risk of being harmed or killed by a 
terrorist who was not detained because the authorities lacked suﬃ  cient 
evidence to hold him are heterogeneously distributed. People in certain 
national, ethnic, and religious minority groups—especially Muslims—
will suﬀ er a much higher risk of erroneous imprisonment than will the 
majority population.⁵⁸ Providing fewer procedural rights to aliens than to 
citizens—as under the Military Commissions Act in the United States—
exacerbates the problem, because it subjects precisely those without polit-
ical power to the increased risk.⁵⁹ However, the problem persists even if 
we envisage a special response to terrorism that applies equally to citizens 
and non-citizens, because, as a practical matter, the nominally inclusive 
programme will still expose Muslims (and some members of other minor-
ity groups) to greater false positive risk than the false positive risk borne 
by the balance of the population.
And that will be so even if we assume no bad faith or invidious preju-
dice on the part of the authorities. = e fact—and I’ll assume it is a fact for 
purposes of this example—that a Muslim is more likely to be a terrorist 
than a non-Muslim, even though the overwhelming majority of Muslims 
are perfectly innocent, will lead the authorities to concentrate their inves-
tigation on individuals who happen to be Muslim. = at will be true even 
if the authorities speciﬁ cally disavow religion as an element of a ‘terrorist 
proﬁ le’, because, by hypothesis, simply following speciﬁ c clues will more 
frequently lead the authorities to Muslim suspects.
= us we come to the hard question: can the conscientious legisla-
tor authorize counter-terrorism policies that, while cost-justiﬁ ed in the 
aggregate, expose innocent members of a religious minority group to a 
substantially greater risk of erroneous detention than the risk that the 
balance of the population faces? In my discussion of torture, I concluded 
that there is no strong moral objection of potential terrorism victims to a 
decision not to expose members of a minority group to a greater risk, and 
that answer should not change whether the risk is torture or unwarranted 
imprisonment. So the conscientious legislator can vote to provide full-
dress civilian court criminal trials to all terrorism suspects; if she does so, 
she might pay a political price but she should be able to sleep at night.
However, suppose our conscientious legislator is either attentive to polls 
or an insomniac. Can she give a persuasive answer to the moral objection 
⁵⁸ For discussion of the relationship between law enforcement and Muslim communi-
ties in the US after 11 September, see A. Elliot, ‘After 9/11, Arab-Americans Fear Police 
Acts, Study Finds’ New York Times, 12 June 2006, A15.
⁵⁹ See MCA ss 948(q), 949(a), 950(a).
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of the minority victim of prophylactic legislation? Before addressing that 
question, I want to register a caveat concerning how we should measure 
costs and beneﬁ ts.
* e Caveat: Total Risk
First, the caveat. I have been talking as though the proper way for a leg-
islator to assess the distribution of risk from a proposed law is to look at 
the distribution of risks and beneﬁ ts from that law alone. Yet a better 
approach may be to tally up the distribution of risks and beneﬁ ts from the 
entirety of government policy. If the optimal policy with respect to one 
phenomenon—vaccination against disease A, say—exposes one group to 
a disproportionately greater share of the risk than the general population 
faces, might that policy be justiﬁ ed by the fact that this group dispropor-
tionately beneﬁ ts from some other policy—such as vaccination against 
disease B—or even something completely unrelated, such as trial by jury 
in criminal cases? I see no reason in principle why, from the ex ante per-
spective, a conscientious legislator could not take this approach. Doing 
so enables the legislature to pursue policies that are optimal in terms of 
their aggregate costs and beneﬁ ts without succumbing to distributional 
objections, by balancing the distributional consequences across diﬀ erent 
policy domains. We might call this approach ‘distributional arbitrage’.
= ere are, however, at least two substantial diﬃ  culties with distribu-
tional arbitrage. = e ﬁ rst is availability. Across policy domains, the same 
people tend to get the short end of the stick. For example, the distribu-
tional arbitrageur looking for a policy to balance the disproportionate 
risk that the poor will bear from a decision to site a sewage plant in their 
neighbourhood will ﬁ nd that most of the other policies on oﬀ er also dis-
proportionately expose the poor to risk.
To be sure, government programmes of redistribution, including 
entitlements and progressive taxation, do disproportionately beneﬁ t 
the poor, including the most disadvantaged members of disadvantaged 
minority groups. But this brings us to the second diﬃ  culty with distri-
butional arbitrage: once we resolve to consider total beneﬁ ts and burdens 
of government policy, there is no natural baseline from which to measure 
beneﬁ ts and burdens.
Can the conscientious legislator vote for a regime of hyper-aggressive 
criminal law enforcement that will disproportionately expose poor minor-
ities to the risk of erroneous imprisonment on the ground that most of 
these people disproportionately beneﬁ t from progressive taxation? If so, 
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how should the conscientious legislator take account of the fact that the 
wealthy disproportionately beneﬁ t from legal protection of private prop-
erty? Policy arbitrage may make sense in principle but in practice it would 
be likely to license legislators to ignore distributional objections, because 
one can always ﬁ nd some policy that disproportionately beneﬁ ts what-
ever group complains about the disproportionate burden a proposed law 
would impose on them.
Conclusion
In the end, I doubt that the legislature can give a persuasive response to 
the disadvantaged minority group member who is subject to prophylac-
tic legislation which, even if optimal in the aggregate, fails of its back-
ground justiﬁ cation in his case—such as the law-abiding Muslims who 
are imprisoned or tortured in the mistaken belief that they pose a terrorist 
threat.
Indeed, I am not even very conﬁ dent in the response I have outlined 
for cases of homogeneously distributed risks and risks that advantaged 
members of the society disproportionately bear. Recall that, in these 
cases, the conscientious legislator says to the unfortunate soul caught up 
by the overbroad law that he was an ex ante beneﬁ ciary. But can’t he still 
complain?
Suppose that the ﬁ ve starving survivors of a shipwreck realize that they 
must kill and eat one of their number if the remaining four are to have 
a hope of surviving until they are rescued. = e person who draws the 
short straw was an ex ante beneﬁ ciary of the procedure because a four-in-
ﬁ ve chance of living another few days is better than the near-certainty of 
death in another few hours. Still, that hardly ensures the morality of the 
procedure once the procedurally fair decision has been made to sacriﬁ ce 
him for the beneﬁ t of the others—even in the case in which he consents 
to the lottery. It would take an extraordinary commitment to procedural 
fairness for the person drawing the short straw not to regard himself (in 
his last moments of life) as having been wronged.
Now note that, in the case of prophylactic legislation, the people who 
end up bearing the brunt of the law’s deliberate overbreadth need not 
have actually agreed with the law, so long as, ex ante, our conscientious 
legislator believes that the law would be in their interest. James Poe, 
whose suﬀ ering is prolonged by the blanket prohibition on assisted sui-
cide, can liken himself to the shipwreck survivor who does not consent to 
the drawing of straws, is outvoted by his fellow survivors, and then draws 
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the short straw. Perhaps in the case of the shipwreck and for all prophy-
lactic legislation that impinges on fundamental interests, we expect that 
grim necessity will overwhelm considerations of morality. If so, we might 
say that prophylactic legislation, like the survivors’ cannibalism lottery, is 
sometimes forgivable, not that it is moral. We cannot even say that much 
where the legislation imposes disproportionately greater risks on vulner-
able groups than on others.
= e conscientious legislator may thus be tempted simply to avoid 
prophylactic legislation whenever it would implicate fundamental inter-
ests. But even that path will often be unavailable because there will be no 
way to craft a legal principle that is not over-inclusive with respect to some 
people. A categorical rule forbidding torture will potentially deprive ter-
rorism victims of their lives because the state fails to discover and defuse 
the ticking bomb; a rule permitting torture will result in the torture of 
innocents; and the state cannot simply do nothing.
= us, ﬁ nally, with moral objections in all directions, the legislator 
may feel liberated to do whatever he wishes to maximize utility or pursue 
whatever other policy aims he favours. In my view, that approach would 
also be inappropriate. = e impossibility of overcoming moral objections 
is not a reason to fail to grapple with them. In the recent past, and espe-
cially in the halls of power in my own country, public oﬃ  cials have far too 
quickly set aside moral considerations in favour of short-sighted views of 
expediency. Morality may sometimes need to bow to expediency, but it 
should not go down without a ﬁ ght.
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